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Quantifying Choice Along the Vertical Coordination Continuum 
 
The qualitative and quantitative results of a study undertaken to test a decision 
framework firms might consider in choosing a vertical coordination strategy are 
presented.  The posited five-step decision making process tested that a change in 
coordination strategy would occur if and only if a “yes” decision was made at each 
step. The results reported as case-based frequencies and as a discriminate analysis 
function provide strong support for the study’s research propositions.  The ability of 
an alternative to reduce the costliness of a coordination error and the acceptability 
of the risk/return tradeoff were critical to the willingness of a sample of producers to 
change coordination strategy.  Implementability was significant, but not to the 
same extent as costliness of a coordination error or acceptability of the risk/return 
tradeoff. 
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Fundamental changes are underway in the U.S. agri-food system, which is altering 
traditional marketing relationships.  Although many firms see these changes as 
threatening traditional open market relationships, the changes are creating 
opportunities based on specifications contracting, strategic alliances, and vertical 
integration.  Given the increasing variety of vertical coordination strategies 
available to agri-food firms, it seems appropriate to develop and test a decision 
model on how to select among these alternatives. 
 
This paper builds upon the earlier work of Peterson, Wysocki, and Harsh (2001), 
and Wysocki (1998) that posited a framework for decision-making along the vertical 
coordination continuum.  In this paper, the case-based and quantitative results of a 
study undertaken to test their framework are presented.  The paper proceeds with 
the following sections: a brief overview of the vertical coordination continuum and 
the related decision framework, research propositions, presentation of qualitative 
and quantitative research results, and areas warranting further research. 
 
Decision Making Along the Vertical Coordination Continuum 
 
Based on the work of Williamson (1973, 1975), Mahoney (1992), and Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992), Peterson, Wysocki, and Harsh (2001) posited that the vertical 
coordination continuum has five major categories of vertical coordination strategy: 
spot markets, specification contracts, relation-based alliances, equity-based 
alliances, and vertical integration.  Exhibit 1 contains a table of the relevant 
definitions for each category of vertical coordination strategy.  The latent variable 
linking the five categories into a true continuum is the intensity of control that the 
alternative strategies employ to assure that proper coordination occurs (i.e., 
coordination with minimum potential for error).  Coordination strategies move from 
low levels of ex ante control intensity (spot markets) to high levels of ex post 
coordination control (vertical integration) while passing through several 
transitional levels of ever increasing intensity (specification contracts, relations-
based alliances, and equity-based alliances). 
 
Peterson, Wysocki, and Harsh (2001) modeled a firm’s decision about which 
strategy to pursue on the continuum as a five-step decision process.  Exhibit 2 
presents this framework.  The framework is based on the presumption that a firm 
already exists and by intention or habit has already established a position on the 
continuum.  All firms would in fact find themselves in this situation.  Given this, 
the first decision step involves a process initiation question: Is the perceived cost of 
the current coordination strategy too high relative to an available alternative 
strategy (Node1, Exhibit 2)?  An existing strategy may be too costly for one of two 
reasons: (1) coordination errors regularly expose the firm to the opportunism of 
trading partners or result in chronic over or under production versus demand, or  
(2) the strategy is more costly to execute than the coordination errors it is designed 
to control. A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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Exhibit 1: Strategy Categories Along the Vertical Coordination Continuum 
 
Strategy  Definition Example 
Spot Market 
Coordination intensity is low.  Parties 
engage in price discovery and make 
either a yes or no decision to enter the 
transaction.  It is easy to walk away 
from the transaction. 
A Midwest corn farmer who calls up 
local grain elevators to find out the 
current cash price for corn.  The 
corn farmer decides to sell his corn 
to the highest bidder. 
Specification 
Contract 
Coordination intensity is moderately 
low.  Contracts are based on the legally 
enforceable establishment of specific 
and detailed conditions of exchange. 
A potato farmer that signs a 
production contract with a potato 
processor for a specific quality and 




Coordination intensity is moderate. 
Relationship based on shared risk and 
benefits emanating from mutually 
identified objectives. 
Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble, 
where Wal-Mart agrees to share 
propriety sales and inventory 
information and P&G physically 




Coordination intensity is moderately 
high. 
Agricultural cooperative, private 
firms who form a joint venture. 
Vertical 
Integration 
Coordination intensity is high.  Tyson coordinates the entire poultry 
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Exhibit 2:  Decision Making Framework For Changing Vertical Coordination Strategies 
 
 
Source:  Peterson, Wysocki, and Harsh 2001.  “Strategic Choice Along The Vertical Coordination 



















Is an alternative programmable?
Would an alternative reduce the 
costliness of coordination?
Is the risk/return tradeoff acceptable?
Is an alternative implementable?
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If a firm decides it is dissatisfied with the current strategy from a costliness 
viewpoint, the second critical question becomes: Would an alternative strategy 
reduce the perceived costliness of coordination (Node 2, Exhibit 2)?  The answer to 
this question depends upon whether or not another strategy would better match the 
intensity (and cost) of coordination control with the costliness of coordination errors.  
The match is judged better or worse under the logical principle that the more costly 
the errors, the more intense the control needed and conversely, the less costly the 
errors the less intense the control. 
 
Again, drawing upon Williamson (1973, 1975), Mahoney (1992), and Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992), Peterson, Wysocki, and Harsh (2001) we identify two criteria that 
can be used to assess the costliness of a coordination error for a given transaction:  
(1) asset specificity1, and  (2) complementarity2.  The costliness of a coordination 
error thus rises with both the level of asset specificity and the level of 
complementarity.  Managers need to assess both of these variables relative to 
specific transactions and then select a coordination strategy that matches the 
intensity of control with the costliness of a coordination error.  If there is no better 
match, the perceived costliness diminishes or becomes less important to the decision 
maker. 
 
If another coordination strategy offers a potentially better match between costliness 
of coordination errors and coordination control intensity, then a third question 
becomes relevant to the strategy change process: Is the potential alternative 
programmable (Node 3, Exhibit 2)?  Mere existence of a potentially better strategy 
for controlling coordination errors is not enough for adoption.  The decision maker 
must now ascertain, if effective, specific management routines exist for making the 
potential strategy workable. 
 
The fourth relevant question becomes: Is the potential alternative implementable 
(Node 4, Exhibit 2)?  Programmability only assures that specific management 
routines exist.  It does not assure that a specific decision maker can effectively 
implement the routines.  Implementability can be conceived as arising from four 
conditions:  (1) capital availability (does the decision maker have the capital 
required to implement the strategy?),  (2) existence of compatible partners (does the 
decision maker have a transacting partner who will meet the needs of the strategy 
being implemented?),  (3) control competence (given that each coordination strategy 
has a different intensity of control, decision makers must examine their competence 
in exercising the type of control required by the strategy to be implemented; 
                                                           
 
1Asset specificity is the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by 
alternative users without sacrifice of productive value. 
 
2Complementarity exists when the combining of individual activities across a transaction 
interface yields an output larger than the sum of outputs generated by individual activities. A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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willingness as well as skill are key to competence), and  (4) institutional 
acceptability: (an obvious test of institutional acceptability is whether or not a 
particular strategy is legal, e.g., not in violation of antitrust laws; institutional 
acceptability is a broader concept that defines what economic behaviors or 
strategies are deemed appropriate by given social, cultural, industrial, or group 
norms, the core values of the firm).  Whether or not a particular alternative strategy 
is deemed implementable will depend on the decision maker’s overall assessment of 
the above four conditions.  Any one condition may create enough concern that a “no” 
decision about willingness to change will result. 
 
Assuming that an alternative is deemed implementable, the fifth and final question 
in the change process becomes relevant: Does the alternative provide a risk/return 
tradeoff acceptable to the decision maker (Node 5, Exhibit 2)?  With this fifth 
question, the explicit task of balancing these potential returns and risks is added to 
the framework.  Obviously, the decision maker’s risk preferences will be a critical 
input to answering this question.  Based on the decision maker’s risk preference it 
seems fair to predict that any alternative strategy must meet the test that the 
perceived risk/return tradeoff of the alternative is superior to the current strategy if 
change is to occur. 
 
The framework of Exhibit 2 proposes that only a “yes” answer to all five of the 
relevant strategic questions will result in a changed coordination strategy.  A “no” 
at any point stops the process from starting or continuing.  A feedback loop is also 
presented in the framework to make it clear that the process of coordination 
strategy evaluation is a dynamic one.  As transaction conditions, resource 
availability, and strategy potential change, the chance to create less costly 
coordination also changes.  As an industry evolves, optimal coordination strategies 
for individual firms within the industry may move in either direction along the 
continuum depending upon changes in asset specificity, complementarity, 
programmability, feasibility, and risk/return tradeoffs. 
 
Research Propositions and Methods 
 
Empirical testing of such a complex framework is difficult.  Research design 
decisions focused on how much of the framework was feasible to observe in an 
initial test, how to operationalize the decision nodes, and how to measure both the 
decision variables and the results.  Given the exploratory nature of this research 
and the focus on a detailed decision process, a case study approach was deemed 
appropriate.  Structured interviews were designed for use with 25 producers in two 
Michigan agricultural subsectors (seed potato producers and celery producers). 
 
The ideal direct test of the decision framework would have entailed finding a group 
of producers who had recently changed or explicitly rejected changing their vertical 
coordination strategy and then interviewing them about their decision process.  A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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Substantial difficulty in identifying such producers precluded this research 
approach.  The researchers did have access to producers in two industries that were 
experiencing performance problems and changing vertical structures.  A research 
design decision was made to use these producers in an interview setting in which 
they were asked to discuss changes in vertical coordination strategy that they had 
recently considered whether or not they had actually implemented the strategy.  
The dependent variable thus became the interviewee’s expressed willingness to 
change vertical coordination strategy based on the decision factors suggested by the 
framework.  Given this database, the initiation step of the decision process node 1 
(Is coordination too costly?) was already completed and assumed to be a “yes.”  
Therefore, the study focused on the remaining four decision nodes (decision nodes 2-
5). 
 
Based on the available case study base, the decision framework gives rise to four 
researchable propositions: 
 
RP1:  IF a decision maker is willing to change vertical coordination 
strategy THEN a “yes” assessment has been made at ALL 
decision nodes (necessary conditions for strategy change). 
 
RP2:  IF a “yes” assessment is made at ALL decision nodes, THEN a 
decision maker is willing to change vertical coordination 
strategy (sufficient conditions for strategy change). 
 
RP3:  IF a decision maker is not willing to change vertical coordination 
strategy THEN a “no” assessment has been made at one OR 
more decision nodes (necessary conditions for status quo). 
 
RP4:  IF a “no” assessment is made at ANY one decision node, THEN 
a decision maker is not willing to change vertical coordination 
strategy (sufficient conditions for status quo). 
 
If the proposed framework is an accurate model of the decision making process for 
altering a vertical coordination strategy, then the four research propositions form 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a willingness or unwillingness to change 
a vertical coordination strategy. These are strongly stated propositions.  “No” at any 
one decision node results in an unwillingness to change while only all “yes” 
responses result in a willingness to change.  The propositions do not allow for trade-
off among the decision nodes, i.e., the potential of a large coordination cost reduction 
will not counterbalance implementation concerns.  The propositions thus create a 
strict test of the decision flow of the framework. A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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Empirical testing of the research propositions was accomplished by using 
methodological triangulation3 (Patton, 1980), i.e., the use of multiple methods to 
study a single problem (Ghauri, et al., 1995).  This research relied on the following 
multiple data collection procedures:  (1) conducting of multiple detailed case studies 
based on in-depth interviews that will apply observed events of two Michigan 
industries against the proposed framework, and  (2) the historical evolution of these 
two industries as documented by scholarly articles, trade publications, and 
eyewitness testimony. 
 
The structured interview procedure on the 25 seed potato and celery producer cases 
involved a series of open-ended and categorical response questions designed to 
capture information concerning decision factors and their impact on the ultimate 
willingness of the producer being studied to change from an existing to an 
alternative vertical coordination strategy.  Each interviewee was asked to provide a 
description of a current strategy and an alternative that was being evaluated.  Both 
the nature of the alternative and the decision process of evaluation were discussed 
in the interview.  Of the 25 alternative strategies, 17 represented movement toward 
more intense coordination control while 8 represented movement toward less 
intense control.  Of the 17 respondents who indicated they were considering a 
strategy change toward more intense control (e.g., spot market to vertical 
integration), ten said they were willing to change while seven said they were 
unwilling to change vertical coordination strategy.  Of the 8 respondents who 
indicated they were considering a strategy change away from more intense control 
(e.g., vertical integration to spot market), only three said they were willing to 
change while five said they were unwilling to change vertical coordination strategy. 
 
Operationalization of Key Decision Variables 
 
A producer’s willingness to change vertical coordination strategy (Dependent 
variable) 
 
The variable was operationalized as a simple dichotomous variable, willingness or 
unwillingness to change vertical coordination strategy, based on the expressed 
preference of the interviewee. 
 
An alternative’s potential to reduce the costliness of coordination (Decision Node 2) 
 
Measuring this independent variable required an exploratory design.  There was no 
everyday language equivalent for costliness of coordination, let alone the potential 
                                                           
 
3Methodological triangulation is similar to what Bonoma (1985) describes “perceptual 
triangulation,” as a method for providing a more complete picture of the business unit under study.  Prime 
sources for perceptual triangulation include: financial data, market performance data, market and 
competitive data, written archives, business plans, and direct observations of management. A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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to reduce such costliness.  A proxy for direct assessment of the variable was 
designed based on the theory underpinning the framework.  The assessment for 
Decision Node 2 was “yes” if the alternative strategy being considered by a producer 
was closer to that producer’s optimal strategy than the producer’s current strategy, 
and “no” if the alternative being considered was further away from optimal.  
Movement toward optimal would be presumed to result in less costliness of 
coordination.  The optimal strategy for a given producer was first determined by 
assessing the level of asset specificity (low, medium, or high; based on two interview 
questions) and the level of complementary (low, medium, or high; based on three 
interview questions) present in the producer’s transaction situation.  The asset 
specificity questions focused on how easy or difficult it would be for the producer to 
convert farm assets from current uses to other uses.  The complementary questions 
focused on  (1) a producer’s strength of stand-alone competitive advantage (this is 
inversely related to complementarity),  (2) how important the producer perceived 
working with others in the food system is as a means of improving firm 
performance, and  (3) how important the producer perceived responding to changes 
in ultimate consumer needs and tastes in order to improve firm performance. 
 
Based on these procedures, eleven producers revealed their optimal vertical 
coordination strategy to be specification contracting, three revealed relation-based 
alliance, ten revealed equity-based alliance, and one revealed vertical integration.  
In turn, there were 15 “yes” assessments for Decision Node 2, i.e., the alternative 
strategy under consideration moved the producer closer to the optimal, and 10 “no” 
assessments, i.e., the alternative considered moved the producer further away. 
 
The research design for the Decision Node 2 assessment was clearly exploratory and 
presumed that the theoretical relationship of the framework was an acceptable 
model of the decision maker’s thought process.  In this sense, the variable was a 
true test of the framework’s abstract concept.  However, if the variable proved to 
have no explanatory value in the analysis, the potential existed that this approach 
would be unable to differentiate between the true impact of this decision variable 
versus an ineffective operationalization of it. 
 
Programmability of the alternative strategy being considered (Decision Node 3) 
 
An alternative was considered programmable (a “yes” at Decision Node 3) if the 
producer could identify effective management routines, which would be used to aid 
in the adoption of the alternative strategy being considered.  Programmability was 
to be coded as low, moderate, or high by the original research design.  However, all 
producers indicated the alternative strategies they were considering were 
programmable.  That is, they all easily identified management routines consistent 
with their considered strategy.  Given that producers were asked to volunteer an 
alternative strategy for use in the interview, it is not at all surprising that this 
resulted in high programmability.  The producers were most likely to consider A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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alternatives with known management routines.  Because there was no variation 
across the 25 cases in the value of this variable, further research is needed to 
explore the relevance of programmability to the model. 
 
Implementability of the alternative strategy (Decision Node 4) 
 
The implementation variable was based on a combined assessment of four major 
factors: capital, compatibility of partners, control competence, and institutional 
acceptability.  Seven interview questions were used to assess implementability.  
Two questions focused on financial capital (amount and access), while one focused 
on availability of labor (human capital).  Another question focused on availability of 
compatible partners and one on institutional constraints.  The remaining two 
questions focused on issues of control competence.  These were complex questions 
that explored (1) a producer’s preferred skill set in dealing with others in 
transaction relationships, and (2) a producer’s preference for engaging in activities 
related to open market verses managed coordination. 
 
Given that Likert and related ordinal categorical scales were used across all seven 
questions, a total implementability rating was constructed using standardized 
scores and a simple equal weighting for all components.  The resulting ratings for 
the 25 cases separated into two logical groups; high implementability alternatives 
(a “yes” for Decision Node 4) and low implementability alternatives (a “no” for 
Decision Node 4).  There were 19 “yes” cases and 6 “no” cases.  
 
Acceptability of the risk/return tradeoff (Decision Node 5) 
 
A direct question about the acceptability of the risk/return tradeoff was asked in the 
interview.  In addition to a “yes” or “no,” the interviewees were asked to elaborate 
on their reasoning.  There were 11 “yes” responses for Decision Node 5 and 9 “no” 
responses.  In five cases, the interviewees were not willing to give a clear yes or no 
response but chose to say they were unsure about the tradeoff.  Four additional 
interview questions were asked with the notion that an index response might be 
more revealing than their response to the direct question.  All reasonable index 
values confirmed the direct question responses.  As a result, the direct responses 
were used in the qualitative analysis.  A different approach became relevant to the 
quantitative analysis, and this will be presented later. 
 
Qualitative Research Findings 
 
Exhibit 3 presents the relevant decision node and the independent decision variable 
data from each of the 25 case studies.  In this table the relationship between 
willingness to change vertical coordination strategy and the four decision variables 
based on decision nodes 2-5 (reduction in costliness of coordination, 
programmability, implementability, and acceptability of the risk/return tradeoff) A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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are expressed as frequencies.  These frequencies state the number and percentage 
of cases, which correctly predicted the direction of causality as stated by each of the 
four research propositions. 
 
In ten out of thirteen cases where the producer indicated a willingness to change 
strategy, all four decision variables were “yes.”  This resulted in 77 percent of the 
cases being correctly classified as predicted by RP1 (if a willingness to change is 
expressed, then all decision node answers are “yes” assessments).  This is relatively 
strong evidence that RP1 should be accepted (not rejected) as a necessary condition.  
However, RP1 failed to hold in three cases. 
 
A review of these cases (denoted as “D” in Exhibit 3) indicated a situation where the 
producer was uncertain about adopting the alternative strategy based on the 
risk/return tradeoff associated with the alternative variable.  A response of 
uncertain meant the producer would not make a clear assessment as to whether the 
risk/return tradeoff would improve.  Therefore, these cases indicated that the 
decision maker was willing to change strategy even with uncertainty about its 
ultimate performance impact.  A weaker form of RP1 (if willingness to change, then 
no decision node has a “no” assessment) would have been 100% confirmed.  Further 
empirical testing of this issue is warranted. 
 
The testing of RP2 revealed that in ten out of ten cases, when all decision nodes 
were “yes” assessments, there was a willingness to change the considered vertical 
coordination alternative.  This is strong confirmation of RP2 as a sufficient 
condition. 
 
RP3 was predicted correctly in 100 percent of the cases.  Twelve out of twelve times 
when there was an unwillingness to change, at least one of the four decision 
variables was also “no.”  In those cases where the producer was uncertain about the 
risk/return tradeoff and they were unwilling to change, there was at least one other 
decision variable that was also a “no.”  There where only two cases where only one 
“no” answer resulted in no change, four cases where two “no” answers resulted in no 
change, and four cases where three “no” answers resulted in no change.  This is 
extremely strong evidence for the support of RP3 as a necessary condition. 
 
The percentage of correctly classified cases used in the testing of RP4 was also 100 
percent.  Twelve out of twelve cases showed when any one “no” response occurred at 
any of the decision nodes, there was an unwillingness to change strategy.  This is 
strong evidence that RP4 should be accepted (not rejected) as a sufficient condition. 
 
Missing cases and the primary decision variables 
 
The case approach to testing the four research propositions would require at least 
one case for all possible combinations of yes/no responses across the four decision A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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Exhibit 3  Frequencies of the Relationship between the Willingness to Change, the Four 
Decision Variables, and the Four Research Propositions 
 
Producer Response At Decision Nodes  Research Proposition 
Case No. 
Willingness to 
Change?  Node 2 
(a) 
Node 3 (b)  Node 4 (c)  Node 5 (d)  RP1 RP2 RP3 RP4 
1 No  No  Yes  Yes  No     H  H 
2 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  H H     
3 No  No  Yes  No  No     H  H 
4 No  No  Yes  Yes  No     H  H 
5 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  H H     
6 No  No  Yes  No  No     H  H 
7 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  H H     
8 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  H H     
9 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  H H     
10 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  H H     
11 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Uncertain  D      
12 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Uncertain  D      
13 No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes     H  H 
14 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  H H     
15 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  H H     
16 No  No  Yes  No  No     H  H 
17 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  H H     
18 No  No  Yes  No  Uncertain     H  H 
19 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Uncertain  D      
20 No  No  Yes  Yes  Uncertain     H  H 
21 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  H H     
22 No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No     H  H 
23 No  No  Yes  Yes  No     H  H 
24 No  No  Yes  No  No     H  H 
25 No  No  Yes  Yes  No     H  H 
Number of cases in which the research proposition holds    10/13    10/10    12/12   12/12 
Percent of cases in which the research proposition holds      77%    100%    100%   100% 
(a): Does an alternative strategy reduce the costliness of a coordination error? 
(b): Is the alternative programmable? 
(c): Is the alternative implementable? 
(d): Is the risk/return tradeoff of the alternative acceptable? 
 
H = relevant research proposition holds. 
D = relevant research proposition does not hold.. 
 
 A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
  124
variables.  The 25 cases used only represented five out of the sixteen possible yes/no 
combinations.  However, eight of the eleven missing cases resulted from the 
problem of having no “low programmability” cases.  Given the nature of the four 
decision variables, there is no reason a priori to expect that any of the combinations 
would not have been observed.  Decreasing the number of missing cases identified 
above could be accomplished by doing more cases and refining the variables 
(especially programmability). 
 
Subject to further case testing for the missing combinations, the findings of the 
previous sections can be used as evidence supporting the research propositions.  
Potential reduction in the costly nature of a coordination error, implementability, 
and risk/return acceptability were found to be necessary and sufficient conditions 
for respondents to change their current vertical coordination strategy. 
 
Quantitative Analysis Based on Discriminate Analysis 
 
In the last section, qualitative observations reported as simple frequencies from the 
case studies provided strong support for the four research propositions.  This section 
extends the analysis of the in-depth interview database by using discriminate 
analysis4.  This analytic tool was employed to examine how the variables in the 
interview database are related, and, when the data permit, to assign causality 
about the decision process for altering a vertical coordination strategy.  The reason 
economists have recognized the importance of qualitative response models such as 
discriminate analysis is that the models’ structures are particularly well suited for 
examining yes/no choices (e.g., a willingness or unwillingness to change vertical 
coordination strategy) and/or selections made from a small number of alternatives 
(e.g., choice of five vertical coordination strategies). 
 
Application of discriminate analysis to the interview database 
 
The linear discriminate function minimizes the probability of mis-classification (the 
cases were divided into two groups: willing to change and not willing to change their 
vertical coordination strategy), if in each group the variables are from multivariate 
normal distribution and the covariance matrices for all groups are equal.  
Appropriate variable transformations were tested for univariate normality based on 
the Shapiro-Wilk’s test (Norusis, 1994).  SPSS® (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences) uses the Lilliefor’s significance correction to adjust for small sample size 
when testing for normality.  Multivariate normality held for each of the 
discriminate functions reported in this research.  The Box’s M test, which is based 
on the determinants of the group covariance matrix, was used to test the equality of 
                                                           
 
4Although logistic regression would be an appropriate quantitative tool for analyzing the 
interview responses, the relatively small number of cases (25), ruled out this approach. A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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the group covariance matrices.  The Box’s M test is designed to test the null 
hypothesis that the covariance matrices are equal.  A small probability (e.g., at the 
.05 level) might lead an investigator to reject the null hypothesis that the 
covariance matrices are equal.  The Box’s M procedure confirmed the presence of 
equal group covariance matrices in all of the discriminate functions used in this 
research. 
 
Analyzing the differences between groups was undertaken to determine whether 
the observed differences between the two sample means was due to random 
variations from one sample to the next, or whether the data came from populations 
where the means were truly different (Iversen and Norpoth, 1987).  Based on a one-
way ANOVA procedure, the means from 17 interview variables were statistically 
different between those producers who exhibited unwillingness to change and those 
producers who exhibited a willingness to change vertical coordination strategies.  
These variables became potential discriminating variables.  These 17 interview 
variables were operationalized into the three decision node variables from nodes 2, 
4, and 5 discussed in the qualitative research findings of this paper.  
Programmability fell out of the model due to no variability in responses, i.e., all 
cases were “yes.”  To meet the normality requirement of the discriminate function, 
node 5 (acceptability of risk/return tradeoff) was represented by two variables, one 
for uncertainty and one for risk. 
 
Calculating and interpreting the discriminate functions 
 
In discriminate analysis, a linear combination of the independent variables is 
formed and serves as the basis for assigning cases to groups.  Discriminate analysis 
establishes weights on the predictor variables so they result in the best separation 
between the groups.  The linear discriminate equation is represented by: D=B0 + 
B1X1 + B2X2 +...BpXp where the X’s are the values of the predictor variables and the 
B’s are coefficients estimated from the data. 
 
Betas are chosen so the values of the discriminate function differ as much as 
possible between the groups, or so that for the discriminate scores, the ratio 
(between-group sum of squares ÷ within-groups sum of squares) is a maximum 
(Norusis, 1994).  Returning to the relevant decision variables of this research, the 
equation for the discriminate function would be:  D=-4.369 + .814X1 -.747X2 +.430X3 
+ .569X4. 
Where 
D = is the discriminate score 
X1  = the reduction in the costliness-of-a-coordination-error variable,  
X2 = the implementability variable,  
X3 = the uncertainty (risk) variable, and  
X4 = the profitability (return) variable. 
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The X1 (decision node 2) and X2 (decision node 4) were operationalized as outlined 
under the qualitative research section, while X3 and X4 now operationalize the 
decision node 5 variable from the qualitative research.  The coefficients for the 
discriminating variables were taken from the unstandardized coefficient matrix 
generated by SPSS®. 
 
Eigenvalues, Canonical Correlation, and the Wilk’s Lambda Measures 
of Discriminate Function Efficiency  
 
Eigenvalues are simply the ratio of between-groups sum of squares divided by the 
within-groups sum of squares.  The larger the eigenvalue, the greater the 
discriminating power of the function.  The eigenvalue associated with the four 
decision variables of Exhibit 4 is 3.907.  The actual number representing the 
eigenvalue cannot be represented directly.  A better measure of the discriminating 
power of the function is the canonical correlation (Klecka, 1980). 
 
Canonical correlation is a measure of the degree of association between the 
discriminate scores and the groups.  The canonical correlation for a discriminate 
function is the square root of the ratio of the between-groups sum of squares to the 
total sum of squares.  Squared, the canonical correlation is the proportion of the 
total variability explained by differences between groups.  The canonical correlation 
for the four decision variables is .892.  When squared, the canonical correlation 
shows approximately 80 percent of the total variability explained by differences 
between unwillingness and willingness to change groups. 
 
Wilk’s lambda is the ratio of the within-groups sum of squares to the total sum of 
squares.  It is the proportion of the total variance in the discriminate scores not 
explained by differences among groups.  Lambda plus the canonical correlation 
squared by definition equals one.  The four decision variables had a Wilks’ lambda 
of .204, which implies approximately 20 percent total variance in the discriminate 
scores was not explained by differences between groups, but by differences within 
the unwilling and willing to change vertical coordination strategy groups. 
 
Interpretation of the structure matrix coefficients 
 
The structure matrix coefficients presented in Exhibit 4 are variables standardized 
to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. These are arranged in order of 
absolute correlation with the discriminate function. 
 
Variables with large absolute coefficients can be thought to contribute more to the 
overall discrimination function, if the variables do not differ greatly in the units in 
which they are measured.  The signs of the coefficients on the variables in Exhibit 4 
make sense intuitively.  An increase in the level of uncertainty (uncertainty is 
considered to be more constraining) and an expected lower profitability (profitability A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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that was considered to be more constraining), leads to an unwillingness to change.  
A reduction in the costliness of a coordination error (moving from no to maybe to 
yes) and increases in the implementability (from low to moderate to high) of the 
alternative result in higher levels of willingness to change.  This particular 
combination of variables in the discriminate function provides good predictive 
ability.  The percent of cases correctly identified was 92 percent for the original 
group and 88 percent for the cross-validated cases5. 
 
The structure matrix also provides insight into the relative importance each of the 
discriminating variables plays in the differences between the groups being studied.  
Uncertainty had the largest absolute value (.698), followed by how constraining the 
expected profit was (.597), whether or not an alternative reduced the costliness of a 
coordination error (-.560), and implementability (-.330).  Uncertainty, expected 
profit and the costliness of a coordination error variable were all close in absolute 
size or close in their correlation with the discriminate function.  These variables 
were clearly important factors in the decision process to alter a vertical coordination 
strategy.  Implementability was far less important.  Based on this finding, the 
sequential nature of the proposed framework represented as five distinct decision 
nodes may not be the best way to represent the decision making process.  Further 
research is warranted to explore the construction of a non-sequential decision node 
framework. 
 
Additional discriminate analysis findings 
 
Exhibit 4 presents a discriminate function consisting of four variables.  One must 
test the possibility that the set of four decision node variables may be controlled or 
moderated by the other possible combinations of variables based on the producer 
interviews. 
 
A total of seventeen variables, based on interview questions, which passed the F 
test for significant differences in group means were analyzed for combinations that 
may have led to additional valid discriminate functions.  While more than 15 
combinations of variables passed the equal covariance test, only eight combinations 
passed both the equal covariance and normality tests. 
 
Exhibit 5 is a collection of all eight of these combinations.  The decision node 
variable combinations highlighted in Exhibit 4 are presented in the column marked 
“Dec. Node Comb.”  There is a relative ordering of the functions according to the 
                                                           
 
5Cross-validation involves leaving out each case in turn, calculating the function based on the 
remaining n-1 cases, and then classifying the left-out case.  Since the case being classified is not included 
in the calculation of the function, the observed (or apparent) mis-classification rate is a less biased 
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following criteria:  (1) percent of total variation explained between groups, and  (2) 
the percentage of cases correctly classified in the original and cross-validated cases. 
 
The inclusion of additional variables did not substantially increase the amount of 
total variance explained by difference between groups of the discriminating 
variables, or increase the predictive ability of the original and cross-validated cases.  
As a result of each of the variables having the same signs, relative magnitudes, and 
grand centroids with the same signs across the eight functions, general 
interpretations can be made regarding how a shift in the discriminating variable 
affects the willingness to change.  As the following variables increase, the 
willingness to change improves:  (1) increased adoption of an alternative strategy 
given the risk/return tradeoff,  (2) the reduction of the costliness of a coordination 
error, and  (3) the implementability of an alternative strategy increases.  There 
were no differences in the interpretation of these functions as compared to the 
function based on just the four decision node variables presented in Exhibit 4. 
 
As the following variables increase in value, the willingness to change from a 
current strategy to an alternative becomes lower: (1) uncertainty becomes more 
constraining,  (2) the potential for profit becomes more constraining,  (3) satisfaction 
with the current strategy increases,  (4) the perceived size of the strategy shift 
increases,  (5) the acres of rented land increases,  (6) the number of people on the 
management team increases,  (7) the mismatch between the revealed coordination 
characteristics of the producer and the alternative strategy increase, and  (8) the 
longer the decision maker or his farm has been in business. 
 
Most of these associations are intuitively appealing.  It should not be surprising 
that increased numbers of people on the management team can lead to 
unwillingness to change given the problems in managing with more people grows 
geometrically.  The longer a person has been in business and its association with an 
unwillingness makes sense because these decision makers may have tried many 
alternative strategies in the past, they may be nearing retirement, or a certain 
amount of path dependence may be prevalent.  The association between increased 
acres of rented land and unwillingness of change is somewhat confounding.  
Perhaps increased acreage of any kind represents a larger number of landlords to 
deal with, more reports to complete (especially if on a share-crop basis), resulting in 
higher transactions costs, thus making it harder for the decision maker to change.  
Another plausible explanation is that rental agreements often span many years and 
are relatively difficult to break.  Producers maybe unwilling to try alternative 
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Exhibit  4  Discriminate Analysis Results: Decision Variables Passing the Normality 
and Equal Covariance Tests 
 
Variable Group  Values 
 
 
Uncertainty of the alternative (Not constraining to Extremely 
constraining) 
Profitability of the alternative (Not constraining to Extremely 
constraining) 
Reducing Costliness of a Coordination Error (No, Maybe, Yes) 







Grand Centroids  Unwilling= 1.973 
Willing =  -1.822 
Eigenvalue  3.907 
Canonical Correlation  .892 
Wilk’s Lambda  .204 
Variation Explained Between Groups  80% 
Variation Explained Within Groups  20% 
Percent of Cases Correctly Classified Original Group  92% 
Percent of Cases Correctly Classified Cross-validated  88% 
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Exhibit 5:  Discriminate Analysis Summary: Other Combinations of Variables Passing 
the Normality and Equal Covariance Tests 
 
Structure Matrix Coefficients8 






















Adopt given Risk/Return Tradeoff? 
(No, Unsure, Yes) 
  -.685         
Uncertainty of the alternative? 
(Not to Extremely) 
.698    .670 .675 .677 .569 .630 .630 .645 
Profit potential constraining? 
(Not to Extremely) 
.597    .574 .578 .580 .487 .540 .540 .552 
Reducing Costliness of a 
Coordination Error (No, Yes) 
-.560 -.558 -.537 -.542 -.544 -.484 -.506 -.506 -.517 
Satisfaction with current strategy? 
(Not to Extremely) 
 .373  .362  .362  .305  .338  .338  
Implementability of Alternatives? 
(Low, Moderate, High) 
-.330 -.329 -.317 -.320 -.321 -.269 -.298 -.298 -.305 
Perceived size of strategy shift? 
(Small or Large) 
   .298        .287 
Acres of rented farm land in 1997? 
(3 categories) 
 .254  .245  .247  .208  .230  .230  .235 
Number of people in management? 
(3 categories) 
 .249      .203  .225  .225  .231 
Mismatch w/ coordination 
characteristics (Low, Moderate) 
 .246      .201  .223  .228 
Years in the business? 
(continuous variable) 
 .211      .173  .191  .191  .196 
Percent of Total Variation 
Explained Between Groups 
80 80 81 81 81 85 83 83 82 
Percent of Total Variation 
Explained Within Groups 
20 20 19 19 19 15 17 17 18 
Percent of Cases Correctly 
Classified Original Group 
92 96 96 92 92  100  96 96  100 
Percent of Cases Correctly 
Classified Cross-validated 
88 88 88 88 88 84 84 80 76 
 
                                                           
8Each column represents a separate discriminate function where the Low centroid (Unwilling 
to change) is positive and the High centroid (Willing to change) is negative. A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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Concluding remarks regarding the use of discriminate analysis 
 
The results of the discriminate analysis of the interview responses revealed that the 
ability of an alternative to reduce uncertainty was critical to the willingness and 
unwillingness to change strategies.  The acceptability of the risk/return tradeoff, the 
final decision variable, was as important as the reduced costliness of a coordination 
error in the analysis.  Implementability was found qualitatively and quantitatively 
significant, although, not to the same extent as costliness of a coordination error or 
acceptability of the risk/return tradeoff.  However, the magnitude of the structure 
matrix variable and the small decreases in predictive power that showed up when 
the variable was removed from the model suggest implementability has less 
explanatory power than either of the other two variables. Programmability was not 
directly assessed because all producers indicated high levels of programmability 
whatever their willingness to change strategies. 
 
There was strong quantitative and qualitative evidence to support research 
propositions two, three and four and moderately strong evidence to support research 
proposition one.  Even with the relatively imprecise instruments (i.e., the decision 
variables), it appears the proposed framework was a reasonable model of how 
decision makers view the decision process for altering a vertical coordination 
strategy. 
 
Areas Warranting Future Research 
 
One broad area warrants further study.  Steps could be taken to improve the overall 
measurement ability of the decision variables and other key variables of the 
framework. 
 
Improving the measurement ability of selected variables 
 
Two of the decision variables: (1) Would an alternative reduce the costliness of a 
coordination error?, and (2)  Is the risk/return tradeoff acceptable?, were very good 
predictors or indicators for a decision maker’s willingness or unwillingness to 
change from their current vertical coordination strategy to an alternative strategy.  
However, these were imprecise instruments in the sense they were either 
dichotomous or trichotomous measures of a complex process.  Additional research 
should incorporate finer measurements of these important variables. 
 
The variable requiring the most measurement improvement was programmability 
because it was not found to be low (or anything other than high) for any of the 
producers who were interviewed.  Producers were allowed to self-select strategies 
they were considering, making the programmability variable irrelevant.  The 
significance of programmability could be tested if additional research is able to ask A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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questions related to programmability prior to having the producer identify possible 
vertical coordination strategies. 
 
It was suggested that implementability, although significant in discriminate 
analysis, was less dominant than the other decision variables.  Further theoretical 
inquiry is needed to reexamine the variables used in the coding of implementability.  
Although the interview responses did not reveal any omitted areas of 
implementability, a clearer mapping of the relationship between implementation 
and these variables is needed. 
 
Although acceptability of the risk/return tradeoff variables proved to explain a great 
deal of the decision process for altering a vertical coordination strategy, further 
refinement of this variable is possible.  This research was not designed to capture 
the true risk preferences of the producers (risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving), 
although respondents’ answers do provide some insight into their risk preferences.  
There is an entire body of research and associated research methodologies, which 
could be used to better test for these effects on the vertical coordination strategy 
decision process.  Additionally, more testing needs to be done on the 
interrelatedness of risk/return with the costliness of a coordination error, 
programmability, and implementability. 
 
Finally, reduction-in-the-costliness-of-a-coordination-error variable should be tested 




A decision making framework for selecting a vertical coordination strategy (Exhibit 
2) was tested based on 25 case studies of producers who were considering changes in 
their vertical coordination strategy, i.e., a “yes” decision had already been made for 
decision node 1.  Based on both qualitative (strictly case-based) and quantitative 
(discriminate analysis) tests of interview responses from these cases, the research 
findings support the validity of the framework.  Specifically, yes/no decisions for 
framework node 2 (potential reduction in costliness of coordination error), node 4 
(implementability), and node 5 (risk/return acceptability) were found to be 
necessary and sufficient conditions to predict willingness and unwillingness to 
change vertical coordination strategy.  Node 3 (programmability) proved not be 
explicitly testable based on the cases because all alternative strategies were deemed 
programmable by the producers, i.e., a “no” response at this node never occurred 
across the cases.  An additional concern about confirmation of the framework was 
raised by the presence of several “uncertain” responses for node 5.  In three of these 
cases, the producers were willing to change strategy even though they were 
uncertain about the risk/return tradeoff, i.e., a failure of the strict need for a “yes” 
at each decision node.  If the producers in these three cases were risk neutral or risk 
loving, it would not be at all surprising that they would be willing to change vertical A. Wysocki  et. al / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
  133
coordination strategy under uncertainty.  However, this suggests that a weaker 
form of the framework may actually be valid. 
 
The validity of nodes 4 and 5 is not very surprising.  Implementability and 
risk/return tradeoff would seem obvious determinants of any managerial decision.  
The validity of node 2, the potential reduction in costliness of coordination, is not so 
obvious.  There is no common language equivalent of this concept among producers.  
However, the concept as operationalized here held up well in both the qualitative 
and quantitative testing, even as implementability proved rather weakly supported 
in the discriminate analysis.  Being so directly related to the transaction cost theory 
that underpins the vertical coordination continuum, this variable and its 
significance in the empirical findings provides an especially relevant test of the 
broader theory. 
 
Further research is needed to improve the overall measurement ability of the 
decision variables and to fill in the missing cases.  The key managerial implication 
of this work is that the framework is potentially relevant to decision making about 
vertical coordination strategy.  In particular, managers need to assess costliness of 
coordination error through consideration of asset specificity and complementarity as 
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